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It is demonstrated that for the entanglement-based version of the Bennett-Brassard (BB84) quan-
tum key distribution protocol, Alice and Bob share provable entanglement if and only if the estimated
qubit error rate is below 25% or above 75%. In view of the intimate relation between entanglement
and security, this result sheds also new light on the unconditional security of the BB84 protocol in
its original prepare-and-measure form. In particular, it indicates that for small qubit error rates
25% is the ultimate upper security bound for any prepare-and-measure BB84-type QKD protocol.
On the contrary, for qubit error rates between 25% and 75% we demonstrate that the correlations
shared between Alice and Bob can always be explained by separable states and thus, no secret key
can be distilled in this regime.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.65.Ud
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum cryptography solves an outstanding problem
of classical cryptography, namely the distribution of a se-
cret perfectly correlated random key between legitimate
users. The first quantum key distribution (QKD) pro-
tocol, which was able to achieve this goal by exploit-
ing characteristic quantum phenomena, was proposed by
Bennet and Brassard [1]. This BB84 protocol is the pro-
totype of a prepare-and-measure QKD protocol, which
allows unconditionally secure key distribution between
two legitimate users, Alice and Bob. Its security against
an eavesdropper, Eve, is guaranteed by the peculiar fea-
tures of the quantum mechanical measurement process
[2]. Later, it was realized that the security of the BB84
protocol is based on an effective entanglement shared be-
tween Alice and Bob. In particular, it was shown that,
from the point of view of Eve, the originally proposed
prepare-and-measure scheme is equivalent to an associ-
ated entanglement-based version of the BB84 protocol
[3, 4, 5, 6]. The security of this latter protocol is guar-
anteed, for example, if the state of the entangled-qubit
pairs shared between Alice and Bob is exponentially close
to being a pure state. Then, according to Holevo’s theo-
rem, Eve’s mutual information with the distributed key
is exponentially small [4, 6].
This equivalence between a prepare-and-measure QKD
protocol and its associated entanglement-based QKD
protocol, has been exploited in various proofs of uncon-
ditional security of the BB84 protocol [4, 5, 6]. In-
deed, that quantum entanglement is necessary for se-
cret QKD, was also emphasized in a more general con-
text, recently [7, 8]. Nevertheless, though with respect
to unconditional security issues the prepare-and-measure
and the entanglement-based forms of the BB84 proto-
col are equivalent, as far as realistic implementations
are concerned both schemes are quite different. Specif-
ically, entanglement-based QKD protocols typically re-
quire quantum memories and quantum computers for
performing the entanglement purification, necessary for
enforcing secrecy even in the presence of an arbitrary
powerful eavesdropper. On the contrary, the correspond-
ing prepare-and-measure schemes do not require this ad-
vanced quantum technology, and are therefore realizable
much more easily with present day technology.
An important quantity characterizing the security of
a QKD protocol is the threshold disturbance, i.e. the
maximal disturbance or quantum bit error rate (QBER)
which can be tolerated by Alice and Bob for being ca-
pable of producing a secret, perfectly correlated random
key. This maximal disturbance quantifies the robustness
of a QKD scheme, and in general it depends not only
on the eavesdropping strategy, but also on the algorithm
(distillation protocol) Alice and Bob are using for post-
processing their raw data [9]. From the practical point of
view, it is most interesting to know the threshold distur-
bance of a given QKD protocol, with respect to the most
general eavesdropping attacks which are consistent with
the laws of quantum mechanics. For such general coher-
ent attacks, it has been demonstrated, for example, that
the prepare-and-measure scheme of the BB84 protocol
is unconditionally secure up to QBERs of approximately
20%, provided one uses appropriate error correction and
privacy amplification protocols, which involve two-way
classical communication [10, 11]. Furthermore, it is also
known that a simple intercept-resend attack can beat the
BB84 protocol giving rise to QBERs ≥ 25% [12]. How-
ever, so far it is unknown whether an arbitrary powerful
eavesdropper, whose power is only limited by the general
laws of quantum mechanics, is able to push the threshold
disturbance below 25% [9, 11, 13].
In this paper we investigate the robustness of the BB84
protocol, with respect to general coherent attacks by an
adversary whose power is only limited by the fundamen-
tal laws of quantum mechanics. As a main result, it
is shown that for QBERs less than 25% Alice and Bob
always share pairs of entangled qubits, even if Eve has
performed a general coherent attack involving quantum
memories and quantum computers. In other words, as
far as the robustness of the protocol is concerned, the
2coherent attacks do not seem to offer any advantage over
collective or incoherent attacks. For the entanglement-
based version of the BB84 protocol our result implies that
Alice and Bob can distribute a random secret key up to
this QBER, provided they purify their corrupted pairs
with the help of an entanglement purification protocol
(EPP) [14, 15]. This result also sheds new light onto the
still open question of the maximal error rate that can be
tolerated by a prepare-and-measure scheme of the BB84
protocol [11, 13]. In particular, in view of the equiva-
lence between the prepare-and-measure scheme and the
entanglement-based version of the BB84 protocol, our
result demonstrates that 25% is indeed the threshold
disturbance for the prepare-and-measure scheme as well.
Thus, in principle Alice and Bob are able to exploit these
quantum correlations for the distillation of a perfectly
correlated secret random key, by means of an appropri-
ate classical distillation protocol which involves two-way
classical communication [10, 11]. Furthermore, as long
as Alice and Bob focus on their sifted key and manipu-
late each qubit-pair independently, for QBERs between
25% and 75% a secret-key distillation is impossible. In
particular, in this case we show that the correlations
shared between Alice and Bob can always be described
by separable states and thus the necessary precondition
for secret-key distillation is violated [7, 8].
This paper is organized as follows: For the sake of
completeness in Sec. II we summarize briefly basic facts
of the prepare-and-measure scheme and the equivalent
entanglement-based version of the BB84 protocol, as far
as they are significant for our subsequent discussion. In
Sec. III we present the proof of our main result while
Sec. IV contains discussion and conclusions.
II. BASIC FACTS ABOUT BB84 PROTOCOL
In the prepare-and-measure BB84 protocol, Alice
sends a sequence of qubits to Bob each of which is ran-
domly prepared in one of the basis states { |0〉, |1〉} or
{ |0¯〉, |1¯〉} which are eigenstates of two maximally con-
jugate physical variables, namely the two Pauli spin op-
erators Z and X . The eigenstates of Z, i.e. { |0〉, |1〉},
and of X , i.e. { |0¯〉, |1¯〉}, are related by the Hadamard
transformation
H = 1√
2
(
1 1
1 −1
)
, (1)
i.e. |¯i〉 =∑j Hij |j〉 (i, j = 0, 1). In the basis { |0〉, |1〉},
the Pauli spin operators are represented by the matrices
X =
(
0 1
1 0
)
, Y =
(
0 −i
i 0
)
, Z =
(
1 0
0 −1
)
. (2)
Bob measures the received qubits randomly in one of the
two bases. Afterwards Alice and Bob apply a random
permutation of their data, and publicly discuss the bases
chosen, discarding all the bits where they have selected
different bases. Subsequently, they randomly select half
of the bits from the remaining random key (sifted key)
and determine its error probability or QBER. If, as a re-
sult of a noisy quantum channel or of an eavesdropper,
the estimated QBER is too high, they abort the proto-
col. Otherwise, they perform error correction and privacy
amplification with one- or two-way classical communica-
tion, in order to obtain a smaller number of secret and
perfectly correlated random bits.
It has been shown that, from the point of view of an ar-
bitrarily powerful eavesdropper, this originally proposed
prepare-and-measure form of the BB84 protocol is equiv-
alent to an entanglement-based QKD protocol [3, 4, 5, 6]
. This latter form of the BB84 protocol offers advantages
in particular with respect to questions concerning its un-
conditional security, and works as follows: Alice prepares
each of, say 2n, entangled-qubit pairs in a particular Bell
state [16], say |Φ+〉 ≡ 1√
2
( |0A0B〉+ |1A1B〉) (where the
subscripts A,B refer to Alice and Bob, respectively). Af-
ter having applied Hadamard transformation on the sec-
ond half of each pair of a subset of randomly chosen qubit
pairs, she sends all the second halves of the 2n pairs to
Bob. Due to channel noise and the presence of a possible
eavesdropper, however, at the end of this transmission
stage all the 2n entangled-qubit pairs will be corrupted.
In fact, they will be entangled among themselves as well
as with Eve’s probe.
In order to ensure secret key distribution even in the
presence of such a powerful eavesdropper, first of all Alice
and Bob perform a random permutation of all the pairs,
thus distributing any influence of the channel noise or
the eavesdropper, equally among all the pairs [5, 11]. Af-
terwards, they perform a verification test, in which they
randomly select half of the pairs [17] as check pairs and
measure each one of them independently, along a common
basis, i.e. the quantization axis of the Bell state |Φ+〉.
However, these measurements are done only after Bob
has reversed Alice’s randomly applied Hadamard trans-
formations. For this latter purpose, after the transmis-
sion stage of the protocol, Alice has to announce publicly
the qubits on which she has applied Hadamard transfor-
mations. Subsequently, the influence of channel noise or
of an eavesdropper is quantified by the average QBER of
these n check pairs, i.e. the probability with which Al-
ice’s and Bob’s measurement results disagree. Note that,
since Alice and Bob perform their measurements along
the quantization axis of the Bell state |Φ+〉, in the ab-
sence of noise and eavesdropping their measurement re-
sults would perfectly agree. Furthermore, assuming that
the check pairs constitute a fair sample [17], one may con-
clude that the same QBER applies also to the remaining,
yet unmeasured, n pairs. After this verification test all
the check pairs are dismissed and, if the QBER is too
high, the protocol is aborted. Otherwise, Alice and Bob
proceed to the purification of the remaining n pairs
For this purpose, they apply an appropriate entangle-
ment purification protocol (EPP) [14, 15] with classical
one- or two-way communication, so that they are able
3to distill a smaller number of almost pure entangled-
qubit pairs. Finally, measuring these almost perfectly
entangled-qubit pairs in a common basis, i.e. along the
quantization axis of the Bell state |Φ+〉, Alice and Bob
obtain a perfectly correlated random key, about which
an adversary has negligible information. For the sake
of completeness we finally want to mention that this
entanglement-based protocol can be reduced to an as-
sociated prepare-and-measure BB84 protocol with error
correction and privacy amplification involving one- or
two-way classical communication, only if the underlying
EPP fulfills certain consistency conditions which are of
no concern for our further discussion [5, 10, 11].
On the basis of the equivalence of these two forms of
the BB84 protocol, it has been demonstrated that by
means of one-way classical distillation protocols a ran-
dom key can be exchanged secretly between the two le-
gitimate users up to a QBER of approximately 11% [5].
Furthermore, post-processing that involves two-way clas-
sical communication can guarantee the extraction of a se-
cret key even up to QBERs of the order of 20% [10, 11].
On the other hand, it is also known that an intercept-
resend attack can always defeat the BB84 protocol (irre-
spective of the distillation protocol employeed by Alice
and Bob) for QBERs above 25% [12]. However, as far
as QBERs between 20% and 25% are concerned, it is
still an open question whether Alice and Bob are able to
exchange a secret key, under the assumption of general
coherent attacks.
III. ENTANGLEMENT AND THRESHOLD
DISTURBANCE OF THE BB84 PROTOCOL
According to a recent observation, a necessary precon-
dition for secret key distillation is that the correlations
established between Alice and Bob during the state dis-
tribution cannot be explained by a separable state [7, 8].
Throughout this work, we consider that Alice and Bob
focus on the sifted key during the post processing (i.e.,
they discard immediately all the polarization data for
which they have used different bases) and that they treat
each pair independently. Thus, according to the afore-
mentioned precondition, given a particular value of the
estimated QBER, the task of Alice and Bob is to in-
fer whether they share provable entanglement or not.
Thereby, entanglement is considered to be provable if
Alice’s and Bob’s correlations cannot be explained by
a separable state within the framework of the protocol
considered. In this section we demonstrate for the BB84
protocol that, as long as the detected QBER is less than
25% or larger than 75%, Alice and Bob can be confident
that they share entangled-qubit pairs with high proba-
bility. Furthermore, for QBERs between 25% and 75%
the correlations between Alice and Bob can always be
explained by a separable two-qubit state.
Adopting the entanglement-based version of the BB84
protocol we described in the previous section, the aver-
age disturbance that Alice and Bob estimate during the
verification test is given by [5, 11, 19]
QBER =
1
2
∑
b=0,1
∑
l=0,1
1
n
n∑
ji; i=1
TrA,B{[HbA|l〉AA〈l|HbA ⊗HbB |l ⊕ 1〉BB〈l ⊕ 1|HbB]ji ρAB}, (3)
where ⊕ denotes addition modulo 2. Thereby ρAB de-
notes the reduced density operator of Alice and Bob for
all 2n pairs while the index ji indicates that the corre-
sponding physical observable refers to the ji-th randomly
selected qubit pair. The powers of the Hadamard trans-
formation Hb, with b ∈ {0, 1}, reflect the fact that the
errors in the sifted key originate from measurements in
both complementary bases which have been selected ran-
domly by Alice and Bob with equal probabilities.
Recall now that Alice and Bob have permuted all their
pairs randomly before the verification stage. This ran-
dom permutation has the effect of distributing the errors
introduced by Eve, over all the qubit pairs in a homo-
geneous way [5, 11]. As a result of this homogenization
procedure all the reduced density operators describing the
state of each pair shared between Alice and Bob become
equal, i.e.
ρ
(1)
AB = ρ
(2)
AB = · · · = ρ(2n)AB . (4)
The reduced density operator of Alice’s and Bob’ s k-th
pair is denoted by ρ
(k)
AB = Tr
( 6k)
AB(ρAB) and Tr
( 6k)
AB indicates
the tracing (averaging) procedure over all the qubit pairs
except the k-th one. Note that in general ρAB is ex-
pected to have a complicated structure as it includes all
the effects arising from a general coherent attack of a
4possible eavesdropper. As a result of the homogenization
procedure, however, the reduced states of the pairs ρ
(k)
AB
are equal and thus the average estimated disturbance (3)
reads
QBER =
1
2
∑
b=0,1
∑
l=0,1
Tr
(j1)
A,B{[HbA|l〉AA〈l|HbA ⊗HbB|l ⊕ 1〉BB〈l ⊕ 1|HbB]j1ρ(j1)AB }, (5)
where Tr
(j1)
A,B denotes the tracing procedure over the j1-
th qubit pair of Alice and Bob. According to Eq. (5),
and in view of the homogenization procedure, the QBER
is determined by the average error probability of an arbi-
trary qubit pair, say the pair j1. Thus, the corresponding
reduced density operator ρ
(j1)
AB contains all the necessary
information about the noisy quantum channel and about
a possible general coherent attack by an eavesdropper,
which is relevant for the evaluation of the average QBER.
In particular, this implies that an arbitrary attack by an
eavesdropper which gives rise to a particular state ρ
(j1)
AB is
indistinguishable, from the point of view of the estimated
average disturbance, from a corresponding individual at-
tack which results in a decorrelated n-pair state of the
form
⊗n
i=1 ρ
(ji)
AB .
In order to address the problem for which values of the
QBER the reduced density operator ρ
(j1)
AB is entangled, we
start from the observation that the QBER of Eq. (5) is
invariant under the transformations
(l, b) → (l ⊕ 1, b),
(l, b) → (l, b⊕ 1). (6)
This invariance implies that there are various reduced
density operators of the j1-th qubit pair, which all give
rise to the same observed value of the QBER. This can
be seen from the elementary relations
XHb|l〉〈l|HbX = Hb|l ⊕ 1⊕ b〉〈l ⊕ 1⊕ b|Hb,
ZHb|l〉〈l|HbZ = Hb|l ⊕ b〉〈l ⊕ b|Hb,
XZHb|l〉〈l|HbZX = Hb |l ⊕ 1〉〈l ⊕ 1| Hb. (7)
Together with the invariance of the QBER under the
transformations (6), these relations imply that the re-
duced operators ρ
(j1)
AB and
ρ˜
(j1)
AB =
1
8
∑
g∈G1,h∈G2
U(h)U(g)ρ
(j1)
ABU(g)
†U(h)† (8)
give rise to the same value of the QBER. Thereby, the
unitary and hermitian operators
U(g1) = XA ⊗XB,
U(g2) = ZA ⊗ZB,
U(g3) = −YA ⊗ YB ≡ XAZA ⊗XBZB,
U(g4) = 1A ⊗ 1B, (9)
and
U(h1) = HA ⊗HB ,
U(h2) = 1A ⊗ 1B , (10)
have been introduced, which form unitary representa-
tions of two discrete Abelian groups G1 = {g1, g2, g3, g4}
and G2 = {h1, h2}. Invariance of ρ˜(j1)AB under these groups
is induced by the symmetry transformations of Eq.(6)
which leave the QBER invariant.
As a consequence of Eq. (8), the density operator ρ
(j1)
AB
is entangled if ρ˜
(j1)
AB is entangled, as both states are re-
lated by local unitary operations and convex summation.
Hence, to determine the values of the QBER for which
Alice and Bob share provable entanglement, it suffices to
determine the QBERs for which the most general two-
qubit state ρ˜
(j1)
AB (which is invariant under the Abelian
discrete groups G1 and G2) is entangled.
Note now that, the hermitian operators U(g1) and
U(g2) of the group G1 constitute already a complete set of
commuting operators in the Hilbert space of two qubits.
Their eigenstates are given by the Bell states [16]. Thus,
the most general two-qubit state which is invariant under
the Abelian group G1 is given by a convex sum of Bell
states, i.e.
ρ˜
(j1)
AB = λ00 |Φ+〉〈Φ+| + λ10 |Φ−〉〈Φ−| + λ01 |Ψ+〉〈Ψ+| + λ11 |Ψ−〉〈Ψ−| . (11)
Thereby, the non-negative parameters λαβ have to fulfill the normalization condition∑
α,β∈{0,1}
λαβ = 1. (12)
5Furthermore, additional invariance of the quantum state
(11) under the discrete group G2 implies that
λ01 = λ10. (13)
As a consequence of this last constraint and the normal-
ization condition, only two of the four parameters λαβ are
independent. According to Eq.(5), the average QBER is
related to these parameters by
QBER = λ11 + λ01. (14)
Let us now determine the possible values of the QBER
for which Alice and Bob share provable entanglement. To
this end, we can take advantage of the Peres-Horodecki
criterion, for example, stating that the state ρ˜
(j1)
AB is dis-
entangled iff its partial transpose is non-negative [20]. In
our case, this condition is equivalent to the inequalities
λ01 + λ11 ≥| λ00 − λ10 |, (15)
λ00 + λ10 ≥| λ01 − λ11 |, (16)
As depicted in Fig. 1, these inequalities, combined
with Eqs. (12) and (13), imply that the reduced den-
sity operator ρ˜
(j1)
AB is entangled if the estimated QBER is
below 1/4 or above 3/4. Given, however, that the states
ρ˜
(j1)
AB and ρ
(j1)
AB are related via local operations and convex
summation, the original single-pair state ρ
(j1)
AB must also
be entangled in the same regime of parameters. Hence
we may conclude that, whenever Alice and Bob detect an
average QBER within this interval, they can be confident
that they share entanglement with high probability, and
their correlations cannot originate from a separable state.
The necessary precondition for secret-key distillation is
therefore fulfilled.
Let us now consider average QBERs with 1/4 ≤
QBER ≤ 3/4. The fact that ρ˜(j1)AB is separable does not
necessarily imply that ρ
(j1)
AB is also separable. But it indi-
cates that in this regime of parameters, Alice’s and Bob’s
correlations within the framework of the BB84 protocol
can be explained by a separable state, namely by ρ˜
(j1)
AB .
According to [7, 8], this implies that Alice and Bob can-
not extract a secret key. A particularly simple family of
such separable states defined for 1/4 ≤ QBERs ≤ 3/4,
for example, is given by
σAB(D) = (4D − 1)1 4
4
+ | 1− 2D |
∑
k∈{0,1}
[
1
2
( |kA〉〈kA| )⊗ ( |kB〉〈kB | ) +
(
σ˜
(k)
A ⊗ σ˜(k)B
)]
. (17)
Thereby, D ≡ QBER, 1 4 denotes the unit operator in
C2A ⊗ C2B and σ˜(k)C = 12 ( |0C〉〈kC | + |1C〉〈(1 ⊕ k)C | ) .
The family (17) is parameterized by the estimated av-
erage disturbance detected by Alice and Bob. Moreover,
any separable state which belongs to this family is in-
distinguishable, from the point of view of the estimated
QBER, from the real state shared between Alice and Bob.
In other words, whenever the detected QBER is between
1/4 and 3/4, the correlations shared between Alice and
Bob can be very well described in the framework of the
family of separable states σAB(D). The necessary pre-
condition [7, 8, 22] for secret key distillation is not met
for disturbances within this regime, so that the protocol
must be aborted.
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
We have discussed the threshold disturbance of the
BB84 QKD protocol under the assumption of general co-
herent attacks which are only limited by the fundamen-
tal laws of quantum theory. If Eve disentangles Alice
and Bob by such a general attack (i.e., Alice’s and Bob’s
correlations can be explained by a separable state) this
gives rise to QBERs between 25% and 75%. Hence, if
Alice and Bob detect a QBER within this interval, they
have to abort the protocol. As an example, we presented
a particular class of separable states which is capable
of describing the correlations shared between Alice and
Bob for 25% ≤ QBER ≤ 75%. For QBERs below 25%
and above 75% the two legitimate users can be confident
that with high probability the quantum correlations they
share cannot be described by separable states.
The relevance of our results in the context of the
entanglement-based version of the BB84 protocol is ap-
parent : Alice and Bob are able to extract a secret key
for QBERs < 25% and QBERs > 75% by application of
an EPP which purifies towards the Bell states |Φ+〉 or
|Ψ−〉, respectively.
However, for the prepare-and-measure forms of the
BB84 protocol there are still open questions. So far, the
highest tolerable error rates that have been reported in
the context of general coherent eavesdropping attacks are
close to 20% [10, 11]. Nevertheless, according to a recent
observation [7, 8], a necessary precondition for secret-key
distillation is that the correlations established between
Alice and Bob during the state distribution cannot be
explained by a separable state. In view of this strong
link between quantum and secret correlations, our results
suggest that in principle the distillation of a secret key
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FIG. 1: Regions of the independent parameters D = QBER
and G = λ00 − λ10 for which the qubit pair state ρ˜
(j1)
AB is
separable (shaded regions). The various constraints that these
parameters have to satisfy, are indicated by straight dashed
lines, namely (a) Eq. (15); (b) λ00, λ10 ≥ 0; (c) Eqs. (12),
(13) and (16); (d) λ01, λ11 ≥ 0 and Eqs. (12), (13). The
protocol operates in the region which is defined by the solid
lines. The threshold disturbances are indicated by black dots
while the dot-dashed line connecting these dots corresponds
to the family of separable states (17).
is in principle possible for QBERs below 25% and above
75%. In fact, if we focus on low disturbances, we can say
that 25% is the upper bound on the maximal QBER that
can be tolerated by any BB84-type prepare-and-measure
QKD protocol. In other words, as far as the robustness
of the BB84 protocol is concerned, coherent attacks do
not seem to offer any advantages over collective or even
incoherent attacks. Nevertheless, finding error correction
and privacy amplification protocols required for a BB84-
type protocol to be capable of meeting this upper security
bound remains an open problem and will be addressed
in subsequent work.
Finally, it should be stressed that the disturbance
thresholds we have obtained depend on the post-
processing of the BB84 QKD protocol. In particular,
they rely on the complete omission of those qubits of the
raw key for which Alice and Bob measured in different
bases. Furthermore, they also rely on the fact that Alice
and Bob manipulate each qubit pair separately. At first
sight it might appear to be puzzling why, under the same
assumptions, it was shown that a secret key can be dis-
tilled in the framework of the BB84 protocol for QBERs
up to about 30%, by means of advantage distillation pro-
tocols. These results, however, have been obtained under
the additional assumption that Eve is restricted to so-
called “optimal incoherent attacks”, i.e. attacks which
maximize Eve’s information gain. One can easily ver-
ify, for example, that the class of separable states (17)
is not optimal (in the sense of [9, 21]). In our work we
allow for arbitrary eavesdropping attacks and thus we
have demonstrated that the distillation of a secret key for
QBERs above 25% is impossible [7, 8, 22]. So, although
the incoherent attacks considered in [9, 21] are optimal
with respect to the information gain of an eavesdropper
[2], they are not able to disentangle Alice and Bob at
the lowest possible QBER (that is at 25%). The cost of
information loss that Eve has to accept by employing an
attack that disentangles Alice and Bob at each particu-
lar disturbance between 25% and 75% remains an open
question. Clearly, to this end one has to consider in detail
the eavesdropping attack and this is beyond the purpose
of this work.
Nevertheless, in principle the distillation of a secret
key for QBERs above 25% is possible, provided that Al-
ice and Bob do not focus on their sifted key only. In this
context it was demonstrated with the help of entangle-
ment witnesses recently, that the detection of quantum
correlations between Alice and Bob is feasible even for
QBERs above 25%, provided the data of the raw key are
also taken into account [7].
V. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Stimulating discussions with Norbert Lu¨tkenhaus are
gratefully acknowledged. We thank an anonymous ref-
eree for insightful comments on the first version of this
paper. This work is supported by the EU within the IP
SECOQC.
[1] C. H. Bennett and G. Brassard, in Proceedings of the
IEEE International Conference on Computers, Systems
and Signal Processing, Bangalore, India (IEEE, New
York, 1984), pp. 175-179.
[2] C. A. Fuchs, N. Gisin, R. B. Griffiths, C. S. Niu ,and A.
Peres, Phys. Rev. A 56, 1163 (1997).
[3] C. H. Bennett, G. Brassard, and N. D. Mermin, Phys.
Rev. Lett. 68, 557 (1992).
[4] H.-K. Lo and H. F. Chau, Science 283, 2050 (1999).
[5] P. W. Shor and J. Preskill, Phys. Rev. Lett. 85, 441
(2000).
[6] D. Gottesman and J. Preskill, Phys. Rev. A 63, 022309
(2001).
[7] M. Curty, M. Lewenstein, and N. Lu¨tkenhaus, Phys. Rev.
Lett. 92, 217903 (2003); see also quant-ph/0409047.
[8] A. Acin and N. Gisin, quant-ph/0310054.
[9] A. Acin, N. Gisin, and V. Scarani, Quant. Info. Comp.
3, 563 (2003).
[10] H. F. Chau, Phys. Rev. A 66, 060302 (2002).
[11] D. Gottesman and H.-K. Lo, IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory
49, 457 (2003).
[12] C. H. Bennett, F. Bessette, G. Brassard, L. Salvail, and
J. Smolin, J. Cryptology 5, 3 (1992); A. Ekert and B.
Huttner, J. Mod. Opt. 41, 2455 (1994).
[13] N. Gisin, G. Ribordy, W. Tittel, and H. Zbinden, Rev.
Mod. Phys. 74, 145 (2002).
7[14] D. Deutsch, A. Ekert, R. Jozsa, C. Macchiavello, S.
Popescu, and A. Sanpera, Phys. Rev. Lett. 77, 2818
(1996).
[15] C. H. Bennett, D. P. DiVincenzo, J. A. Smolin, andW. K.
Wooters, Phys. Rev. A 54, 3824 (1996); C. H. Bennett,
Gilles Brassard, S. Popescu, B. Schumacher, J. A. Smolin
and W. K. Wooters, Phys. Rev. Lett. 76, 722 (1996).
[16] The Bell states, |Φ±〉 ≡ 1√
2
( |0A0B〉 ± |1A1B〉) and
|Ψ±〉 ≡ 1√
2
( |0A1B〉± |1A0B〉), form an orthonormal basis
in the two-qubit Hilbert space.
[17] It is worth noting that a logarithmic scaling of the size of
the random sample with the length of Alice’s and Bob’s
key, is sufficient for security issues. See Ref. 18 for a rig-
orous proof. Nevertheless, throughout this work we will
consider that half of the pairs are sacrificed for the veri-
fication test.
[18] H.-K. Lo, H. F. Chau and M. Ardehali,
quant-ph/0011056.
[19] Note that in the absence of noise and eavesdropping each
pair of qubits shared between Alice and Bob is in the Bell
state |Φ+〉. Thus, in this ideal system, Alice and Bob ob-
tain perfectly correlated measurement results whenever
they perform their measurements along the same basis.
[20] A. Peres, Phys. Rev. Lett. 77, 1413 (1996); M. Horodecki,
P. Horodecki, and R. Horodecki, Phys. Lett. A 223, 8
(1996).
[21] N. Gisin and S. Wolf, Phys. Rev. Lett. 83, 4200 (1999).
See also quant-ph/0005042.
[22] A. Acin, L. Masanes, and N. Gisin, Phys. Rev. Lett. 91,
167901 (2003).
